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Abstract
This note follows our previous works on games with randomly arriving
players [3] and [5]. Contrary to these two articles, here we seek a dynamic
equilibrium, using the tools of piecewise deterministic control systems The
resulting discrete Isaacs equation obtained is rather involved. As usual, it
yields an explicit algorithm in the finite horizon, linear-quadratic case via a
kind of discrete Riccati equation. The infinite horizon problem is briefly con-
sidered. It seems to be manageable only if one limits the number of players
present in the game. In that case, the linear quadratic problem seems solvable
via essentially the same algorithm, although we have no convergence proof,
but only very convincing numerical evidence.
We extend the solution to more general entry processes, and more impor-
tantly, to cases where the players may leave the game, investigating several
stochastic exit mechanisms.
We then consider the continuous time case, with a Poisson arrival pro-
cess. While the general Isaacs equation is as involved as in the discrete time
case, the linear quadratic case is simpler, and, provided again that we bound
the maximum number of players allowed in the game, it yields an explicit al-
gorithm with a convergence proof to the solution of the infinite horizon case,
subject to a condition reminiscent of that found in [20].
As in the discrete time case, we examine the case where players may
leave the game, investigating several possible stochastic exit mechanisms.
MSC: 91A25, 91A06, 91A20, 91A23, 91A50, 91A60, 49N10, 93E03.
Foreword This report is a version of the article [2] where players minimize
instead of maximizing, and the linear-quadratic examples are somewhat different.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The problem investigated
In [14], we showed how the diet selection behaviour of a forager on a patch of
resources of diverse qualities is affected byt the potential arrival, at a random time,
of a competing conspecific. Only one possible arrival was considered, leaving
open the question of what happens if the number of possible later arrivals is larger,
and even not a priori bounded as in a Poisson process. In [5], we consider such a
Poisson arrival process, but where the behaviour of the foragers is given, specified
by their functional response. We gave examples with an exhaustable/renewable
resource and several types of functional responses.
In the current report, we investigate the case where the behavour of the ran-
domly arriving players is not given a priori. In contrast, we let them adjust their
strategies. We know their rate of payoff accumulation as a function of their number
and their strategies at each instant of time, and seek their equilibrium strategies in
the dynamic game thus defined.
We formulate this problem as a rather general dynamic game with random entry
of identical players, in finite or infinite horizon. We also consider different possible
schemes of random exit from the game. And we pay a particular attention to the
linear quadratic case, which, unsuprisingly, leads to a more explicit solution via a
set of Riccati-like equations. We investigate all these questions in both a discrete
time and a continuous time versions, using respectively dynamic programming and
Piecewise Deterministic Markov Decision Processes (PDMDP) (see [26, 24, 28,
15].
This piece of theory may have applications elsewhere than in foraging theory;
most noticeably in economic science where, e.g., competitors on a given market
may show-up at unpredictible times. This is developped in the “economics version”
of this paper [4], which is essentially the same article as this report, except that
• the notation are somewhat different,
• the introduction and conclusion of the economics version stress applications
in the field of economic sciences,
• here the players minimize a cost (to be in the spirit of the mathematical
engineering literature and offer the other, minimizing, version of the game)
while in the economics version the players maximize,
• the Linear Quadratic (L.Q.) example has both terms in the cost of the same
sign, in the tradition of the mathematical engineering literature, while in the
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economics version, the underlying model induced us into choosing terms of
different signs, leading to a somewhat different theory,
• in the economics version, the L.Q. case is followed by a further example in
Cournot oligopoly theory.
Yet, the two versions have so much in common that this technical report is not
offered for publication elsewhere than as an INRIA Technical Report.
1.2 Previous literature
We provided in [3] a rather complete review of the literature on games with a
random number of players, and of some related topics. The general diagnostic is
that where the number of players is random, there is no time involved, and therefore
no notion of entry. Typical example are auction theory, see[19] or Poisson games,
see [21, 7] . And where there is a time structure in the game, there is a fixed
number of players, such as in stochastic games, see [22], or in generalized secretary
problems, see [11]. And in the literature on entry equilibrium, such as [25, 6], the
players are the would-be entrants, the number of which is known.
One notable exception is the article [16] which explicitly deals with a dynamic
game with random entry. In that article, the authors describe a problem more com-
plicated than ours on three counts at least:
1. There are two types of players: a major one, an incumbent, who has an
infinite horizon, and identical minor ones that enter at random and leave
after a fixed time T (although the authors mention that they can also deal
with the case where T is random).
2. Each player has its own state and dynamics. Yet, the criteria of the players
only depend on a mean value of these states, simplifying the analysis, and
opening the way for a simplified analysis in terms of mean field in the large
number of minor players case.
3. All the dynamics are noisy.
It is simpler than ours in that it does not attempt to foray away from the discrete
time, linear dynamics, quadratic payoff case. Admittedly, our results in the nonlin-
ear case are rather theoretical and remain difficult to use beyond the L.Q. case. But
we do deal with the continuous time case also.
Due to the added complexity, the solution proposed is much less explicit than
what we offer in the linear quadratic problem. Typically, the authors solve the two
maximization problems with opponents’ strategies fixed and state that if the set
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of strategies is “consistent”, i.e. solve the fixed point problem inherent in a Nash
equilibrium, then it is the required equilibrium. The algorithm proposed to solve
the fixed point problem is the natural Picard iteration. A convergence proof is only
available in a very restrictive case.
2 Discrete time
2.1 The problem
2.1.1 Players, dynamics and cost
Time t is an integer. An horizon T ∈ N is given, and we will write {1, 2, . . . , T} =
T, thus t ∈ T. A state space X is given. A dynamic system in X may be controlled
by an arbitrary number of agents. The number m of agents varies with time. We
let m(t) be that number at time t. The agents arrive as a Bernoulli process with
variable probability; i.e. at each time step there may arrive only one player, and
this happens with a probability pm when m players are present, independently of
previous arrivals. We call tn the arrival time of the n-th player, un ∈ U its decision
(or control).
We distinguish the finite case where X and U are finite sets, from the infinite
case where they are infinite. In that case, they are supposed to be topologic spaces,
U compact.
Note concerning the notation We use lower indices to denote players, and
upper indices to denote quantities pertaining to that number of agents in the game.
An exception is Um which is the cartesian power set U×U× · · · ×Um times. We
use the notation:
um = (um1 , u
m
2 , . . . , u
m
m) ∈ Um , v×m =
m times
(
︷ ︸︸ ︷
v, v, . . . , v) ,
um\n = (u1, . . . , un−1, un+1, . . . , um) ,
{um\n, u} = {u, um\n} = (u1, . . . , un−1, u, un+1, . . . , um)
The dynamics are ruled by the state equation in X:
x(t+ 1) = fm(t)(t, x(t), um(t)(t)) , x(0) = x0 . (1)
A double family of stepwise costs, for n ≤ m ∈ T is given: Lmn : T× X× Um →
R : (t, x, um) 7→ Lmn (t, x, um), as well as a discount factor r ≤ 1. The overall
cost of player n, which it seeks to minimize, is
Jn(tn, x(tn), {um}m≥n) = E
T∑
t=tn
rt−tnLm(t)n (t, x(t), u
m(t)(t)) . (2)
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Player
m(t) 1 2 · · · t
1 u11(t) u
1(t)
2 u21(t) u
2
2(t) u
2(t)
...
...
...
. . .
...
t ut1(t) u
t
2(t) . . . u
t
t(t) u
t(t)
U1(t) U2(t) . . . Ut(t)
Table 1: Representation of U t(t), the section at time t of an open-loop profile of
strategies U(·). In the rightmost column: the names of the lines, in the last line:
the names of the columns.
Moreover, all players are assumed to be identical. Specifically, we assume that
1. The functions fm are invariant by a permutation of the un,
2. the functions Lmn enjoy the properties of a game with identical players as
described in Appendix A. That is: a permutation of the un produces an
identical permutation of the Lmn .
Finally, in the infinite case, the functions fm and Lm are all assumed continuous.
2.1.2 Pure strategies and equilibria
We have assumed that the current number of players in the game at each step is
common knowledge. We therefore need to introduce m(t)-dependent controls:
denote by Un ∈ Un = UT−n+1 a complete n-th player’s decision, i.e. an ap-
plication {n, . . . , T} → U : m 7→ umn . We recall the notation for a strategy
profile: um = (um1 , u
m
2 , . . . , u
m
m) ∈ Um. We also denote by Um a decision profile:
Um = (U1, U2, . . . , Um). It can also be seen as a family Um = (u1, u2, . . . , um).
The set of elementary controls in U t is best represented by Table 1 where umn (t)
is the control used by player n at time t if there are m players in the game at that
time. A partial strategy profile (U1, . . . , Un−1, Un+1, . . . , Um) where Un is miss-
ing, will be denoted Um\n. An open-loop profile of strategies is characterized by a
sequence U(·) : T 3 t 7→ U t(t). A partial open-loop strategy profile where Un(·)
is missing will be denoted U\n(·).
The cost Jn(tn, x(tn), U(·)) is a mathematical expectation conditioned on the
pair (tn, x(tn)), which is a random variable independent from Un(·).
5
Definition 2.1 An open loop dynamic pure Nash equilibrium is a family history
Û(·) such that
∀n ∈ T , ∀(tn, x(tn)) ∈ T× X ,∀Un(·) ∈ Un , Jn({Û\n(·), Un(·)}) ≥ Jn(Û(·)) .
(3)
Definition 2.2 A Nash equilibrium will be called uniform if at all times, all players
present in the game use the same decision, i.e., with our notations, if, for all t, for
all m, uˆm(t) = uˆ(t)×m for some sequence uˆ(·).
Remark 2.1 A game with identical players may have non uniform pure equilib-
ria, and even have pure equilibria but none uniform. However, if it has a unique
equilibrium, it is a uniform equilibrium (see appendix A).
However, we will be interested in closed loop strategies, and more specifically
state feedback strategies; i.e. we assume that each player is allowed to base its
control at each time step t on the current time, the current state x(t) and the current
numberm(t) of players in the game. We therefore allow families of state feedbacks
indexed by the number m of players:
ϕm = (ϕm1 , ϕ
m
2 , . . . , ϕ
m
m) : T× X→ Um
and typically let
umn (t) = ϕ
m
n (t, x(t)) .
We denote by Φn ∈ Fn a whole family (ϕmn (·, ·) ,m ∈ {n, . . . , T}) (the complete
strategy choice of a player n), Φ a complete strategy profile, Φ\n a partial strategy
profile specifying their strategy Φ` for all players except player n. A closed loop
strategy profile Φ generates through the dynamics and the entry process a random
open-loop strategy profile U(·) = Γ(Φ). With a transparent abuse of notation, we
write Jn(Φ) for Jn(Γ(Φ)).
Definition 2.3 A closed loop dynamic pure Nash equilibrium is a profile Φ̂ such
that
∀n ∈ T , ∀(tn, x(tn)) ∈ T× X ,∀Φn ∈ Fn , Jn({Φ̂\n,Φn}) ≥ Jn(Φ̂) . (4)
It will be called uniform if it holds that ϕˆm = ϕˆ×m.
We further notice that using state feedback strategies (and dynamic programming)
will naturally yield time consistent and subgame perfect strategies.
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2.1.3 Mixed strategies and disturbances
For the sake of simplicity, we will emphasize pure strategies hereafter. But of
course, a pure Nash equilibrium may not exist. In the discrete time case investi-
gated here, we can derive existence results if we allow mixed strategies.
Let U be the set of probability distributions over U. Replacing U by U in the
definitions of open-loop and closed-loop strategies above yields equivalent open-
loop and closed-loop behavioral mixed strategies. By behavioral, we mean that we
use sequences of random choices of controls and not random choices of sequences
of controls. See [1] for a more detailed analysis of the relationship between various
concepts of mixed strategies for dynamic games.
In case the strategies are interpreted as mixed strategies, um(t)(t) in equations
(1) and (2) are random variables, and the pair (m(·), x(·)) is a (controlled) markov
chain. But since anyhow, m(·) is already a markov chain even with pure strategies,
the rest of the analysis is unchanged.
We might go one step further and introduce disturbances in the dynamics and
the cost. Let {w(·)} be a sequence of independent random variables in R`, and
add the argument w(t) in both fm and Lmn . All results hereafter in the discrete
time problem remain unchanged (except for formula (9) where one term must be
added). We keep with the undisturbed case for the sake of simplicity of notation,
and because in the continuous time case, to be seen later, it spares us the Ito terms
in the equations.
2.2 Isaacs’ equation
2.2.1 Finite horizon
We use dynamic programming, and therefore Isaacs’ equation in terms of a family
of Value functions V mn : T×X→ R. It will be convenient to associate to any such
family the family Wmn defined as
Wmn (t, x) = (1− pm)V mn (t, x) + pmV m+1n (t, x) , (5)
and the Hamiltonian functions
Hmn (t, x, u
m) := Lmn (t, x, u
m) + rWmn (t+ 1, f
m
n (t, x, u
m)) . (6)
We write Isaacs’ equation for the general case of a non uniform equilibrium, but
the uniform case will be of particular interest to us.
Theorem 2.1 : An subgame perfect equilibrium Φ̂ = {ϕˆmn } exists, if and only if
there is a family of functions V mn satisfying the following Isaacs equation, which
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makes use of the notation (5), (6):
∀n ≤ m ∈ T , ∀(t, x) ∈ {0, . . . , T} × X , ∀u ∈ U ,
V mn (t, x) = H
m
n (t, x, ϕˆ
×m(t, x)) ≤ Hmn (t, x, {ϕˆm\n(t, x), u}) ,
∀m ∈ T , ∀x ∈ X , V mn (T + 1, x) = 0 .
And then, the equilibrium cost of player n joining the game at time tn at state xn
is V nn (tn, xn). If the equilibrium is uniform, i.e. for all n ≤ m, ϕˆmn = ϕˆm1 , then
V mn = V
m
1 for all m,n (and we may call it V
m).
Proof This is a classical dynamic programming argument. We notice first that
the above system can be written in terms of conditional expectations given (m,x)
as
∀n ≤ m ∈ T , ∀(t, x) ∈ {0, . . . , T} × X , ∀u ∈ U ,
V mn (t, x) = Em,x
[
Lmn (t, x, ϕˆ
m(t, x))
+rV
m(t+1)
n
(
t+ 1, fm(t, x, ϕˆm(t, x))
)]
≤ Em,x
[
Lmn (t, x, {ϕˆm\n(t, x), u})
+rV
m(t+1)
n
(
t+ 1, fm(t, x, {ϕˆm\n(t, x), u}))]
∀m ∈ T , ∀x ∈ X , V mn (T + 1, x) = 0 .
Assume first that all players use the strategy ϕˆ. Fix an initial time tn (which may
or may not be the arrival time of the n-th player) an state xn and an initial m.
Assume all players use their control ϕˆn(t, x(t)), and consider the random process
(m(t), x(t)) thus generated. For brevity, write uˆm(t) := ϕˆm(t, x(t)). Write the
equality in theorem 2.1 at all steps of the stochastic process (m(t), x(t), uˆm(t)(t)):
V m(t, x(t)) = Em(t),x(t)
[
Lm(t)n
(
t, x(t), uˆm(t)(t)
)
+ rV m(t+1)n
(
t+ 1, x(t+ 1)
)]
.
Multiply by rt−tn , take the a priori expectation of both sides and use the theorem
of embedded conditional expectations, to obtain
E
[
−rt−tnV m(t)n (t, x(t)) + rt−tnLm(t)n
(
t, x(t), uˆm(t)(t)
)
+ rt+1−tnV m(t+1)n (t+ 1, x(t+ 1))
]
= 0 .
Sum these equalities from tn to T and use V mn (T + 1, x) = 0 to obtain
−V mn (tn, xn) + E
[
T∑
t=tn
rt−tnLm(t)n (t, x(t), uˆ
m(t))
]
= 0 ,
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hence the claim that the cost of all players from (tn, xn,m) is just V mn (tn, xn), and
in particular the cost of player n as in the theorem.
Assume now that player n deviates from ϕˆn according to any sequence un(·).
Exactly the same reasoning, but using the inequality in the theorem, will lead to
Vn(tn, xn) ≤ Jn. We have therefore shown that the conditions of the theorem are
sufficient for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Finally, assume that the subgame perfect equilibrium exists. Let V mn (t, x) be
defined as the cost to player n in the subgame starting withm players at (t, x). The
equality in the theorem directly derives from the linearity (here, additivity) of the
mathematical expectation. And if at one (m, t, x) the inequality were violated, for
the subgame starting from that situation, a control un(t) = u would yield a lower
expectation for player n, which is in contradiction with the fact that Φ̂ generates an
equilibrium for all subgames.
Concerning a uniform equilibrium, observe first that (for all equilibria), for
all m,n, for all x ∈ X, V mn (T + 1, x) = 0. Assume that V mn (t + 1, x) =
V m1 (t + 1, x). Observe that then, in the right hand side of Isaacs’ equation, only
Lmn depends on n. let pi be a permutation that exchanges n and 1. By hypothesis,
Lmn (t, x, ϕˆ
pi[m](t, x)) = Lm1 (t, x, ϕˆ
m). But for a uniform equilibrium, it also holds
that ϕˆpi[m](t, x) = ϕˆm(t, x). Hence V mn (t, x) = V
m
1 (t, x).
Isaacs’ equation in the theorem involves a sequence of Nash equilibria of the
Hamiltonian. In general, stringent conditions are necessary to ensure existence of
a pure equilibrium. However, our hypotheses ensure existence of a mixed equilib-
rium (see, e.g. [8] and [1]). And since the equation is constructive via backward
induction, we infer
Corollary 2.1 A dynamic subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in behavioural strate-
gies exists in the finite horizon discrete time game..
A natural approach to using the theorem is via Dynamic Programming (back-
ward induction). Assume that we have discretized the set of reachable states in Nt
points at each time t. (Or x ∈ X, a finite set) The theorem brings the determination
of a subgame perfect equilibrium set of strategies to the computation of
∑
t t×Nt
Nash equilibria (one for each value of m at each (t, x)). A daunting task in gen-
eral. However, the search for a uniform equilibrium may be much simpler. On the
one hand, there is now a one-parameter family of functions V m(t, x), and, in the
infinite case, if all functions are differentiable (concerning Wmn this is not guaran-
teed by regularity hypotheses on fm and Lmn ) and if the equilibrium is interior, the
search for each static Nash equilibrium is brought back to solving an equation of
the form (34):
∂u1L
m
1 (t, x, u
×m) + r∂xWm(t+ 1, fm(t, x, u×m)) ∂u1f
m(t, x, u×m) = 0 .
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We will see that in the linear quadratic case that we will consider, this can be done.
2.2.2 Infinite horizon
We consider the same problem as above, with both fm and Lmn independent from
time t. We assume that the Lmn are uniformly bounded by some number L, and we
let the cost of the n-th player in a (sub)game starting with n players at time tn and
state x(tn) = xn be
Jn(tn, xn;U(·)) = E
∞∑
t=tn
rt−tnLm(t)n (x(t);u
m(t)(t)) . (7)
We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium set of strategies ϕˆmn (x). Isaacs equation
becomes an implicit equation for a bounded infinite family of functions V mn (x).
Using the time invariant form of equations (5) and (6), we get:
Theorem 2.2 Let r < 1. Then, a subgame perfect equilibrium Φ̂ of the infinite
horizon game exists if and only if there is a two-parameter infinite family of uni-
formly bounded functions V mn (x) satisfying the following Isaacs equation:
∀n ≤ m ∈ N , ∀x ∈ X , ∀u ∈ U ,
V mn (x) = H
m
n (x, ϕˆ
m(x)) ≤ Hmn (x, {ϕˆm\n(x), u}) .
Then, the equilibrium cost of player n joining the game at state xn is V nn (xn). If
the equilibrium is uniform, V mn = V
m
1 for all n,m.
Proof The proof proceeds along the same lines as in the finite horizon case. In
the summation of the sufficiency proof, there remains a term rT−tnV m(x(T )) that
goes to zero as T goes to infinity, because the functions V m have been assumed
to be bounded. And this is indeed necessary since the bound assumed on the Lmn
implies that the Value functions are bounded by L/(1− r).
We restrict our attention to uniform equilibria, so that we have a one-parameter
family of Value functions V m. But it is infinite. To get a feasible algorithm, we
make the following assumption:
Hypothesis 2.1 There is a finite M ∈ N such that pM = 0.
Thanks to that hypothesis, there is a finite number M of Value functions to con-
sider. There remains to find an algorithm to solve for the fixed points bearing on
the family {V m(x)}m for all x ∈ X. We offer the conjecture that the mapping from
the family {V m(t + 1, ·)}m to the family {V m(t, ·}m in the finite horizon Isaacs
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equation is a contraction in an appropriate distance. If so, then it provides an al-
gorithm of “iteration on the Value” to compute the V m(x) of the infinite horizon
problem. (We will offer a different conjecture in the linear quadratic case.)
Remark 2.2 Hypothesis 2.1 is natural in case the payoff is decreasing with the
number of players and there is a fixed entry cost. Otherwise, it may seem artificial
and somewhat unfortunate. Yet, we may notice that for any numerical implemen-
tation, we are obliged to consider only a bounded (since finite) set of x. We are
accustomed to doing so, relying upon the assumption that very large values of x
will be reached very seldom, and play essentially no role in the computation. In
a similar fashion, we may think that very large values of m(t) will be reached for
very large t, which, due to the discount factor, will play a negligible role in the
numerical results. This is an unavoidable feature of numerical computations, not
really worse in our problem than in classical dynamic programming.
2.3 Entering and leaving
2.3.1 Methodology
It would be desirable to extend the theory to a framework where players may also
leave the game at random. However, we must notice that although our players are
identical, the game is not anonymous. As a matter of fact, players are labelled
by their rank of arrival, and their payoffs depend on that rank. We must therefore
propose exit mechanisms able to take into account who leaves the game. Before
doing so, we agree on the fact that once a player has left the game, it does not re-
enter. (Or if it does, this new participation is considered as that of another player.)
Let Tn be the exit time of the player of rank n, a random variable. We now have
Jn(tn, x(tn), U(·)) = E
Tn∑
t=tn
rt−tnLm(t)n (t, x(t), u
m(t)(t)) .
In defining the controls of the players, we may no longer have n ≤ m ≤ t as
previously, and Table 1 must be modified accordingly. Let N(m) be the maximum
possible rank of players present when there arem of them, andM(n) the maximum
possible number of players present when player n is. Then um(t) = {umn }n≤N(m)
and Un(t) = {umn (t)}m≤M(n). And of course, a choice of umn (t) means the deci-
sion that player of rank n chooses at time t if there are m players present at that
time, including himself.
We also insist that the probabilities of entry (or exit) are functions such as pm
of the current number of players present, and not of the rank of entry.
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When a player leaves the game, from the next time step on it will not get any
cost. Thus, we may just consider that for it, the Value functions V mn (t + 1, x) are
null. To take this into account we determine the probabilities Pm,k that there be
k players at the next time step and that the focal player has not left, knowing that
there are m players present at the current step. And then, Theorem 2.1 above and
its proof remain unchanged upon substituting
Wmn =
∑
k
Pm,kV kn
to equation (5). (In the Bernoulli entry-only version of the problem, we may set
Pm,m+1 = p and Pm,m = (1− p).)
We propose several entry and exit mechanisms as examples.
2.3.2 A joint scheme
In this scheme, there is a probability qm that one player leaves the game at the end
of a step where there are m players present. (And of course, q0 = 0.) Moreover,
we add the dictum that should one player actually leave, which one leaves is chosen
at random with uniform probability among the players present. As a consequence,
each player present has a probability qm/m to leave the game at (the end of) each
time step. Let m(t) = m, then the probabilities that a given player among the m
present at step t be still present at time t+ 1 and that m(t+ 1) take different values
is given by the following table:
m(t+ 1) probability
m+ 1 Pm,m+1 = pm(1− qm) ,
m Pm,m = pmqm
m− 1
m
+ (1− pm)(1− qm)
m− 1 Pm,m−1 = (1− pm)qmm− 1
m
.
2.3.3 Individual schemes
The previous scheme is consistent with our entry scheme. But it might not be the
most realistic. We propose two other schemes.
In the first, each player, once it has joined the game, has a probability q of
leaving the game at each time step, independently of the other players and of the
past and current arrivals sequence. We need powers of p and q. So, to keep the
sequel readable, we take them constant, and upper indices in the table below are
powers. It is only a matter of notation to take them dependent on m. In computing
the probability that a given number of players has left, we must remember that
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those must be chosen among the other m − 1 players, and that the focal player
must have remained. The corresponding table of probabilities is now
m(t+ 1) probability
m+ 1 Pm,m+1 = p(1− q)m ,
1 < k ≤ m Pm,k= (m−1)!(m−k)!(k−2)!qm−k(1−q)k−1
[
(1−p)(1−q)
k−1 +
pq
m−k+1
]
,
1 Pm,1 = (1− p)(1− q)qm−1 .
A more coherent scheme, but that drives us away from the main stream of this
article, is one where there is a finite pool of M agents who are eligible to enter
the game. At each time step, each of them has a probability p of actually entering.
Once into the game, each has a probability q of leaving at each time step, and if so,
it re-enters the pool. In that case, we set
Lm,k = {` ∈ N|` ≥ 0 , ` ≥ m− k , ` ≤ m− 1 , ` ≤M − k}
and we have, for all m, k less or equal to M :
Pm,k =
∑
`∈Lm,k
(
m− 1
`
)(
M −m
k −m+ `
)
pk−m+`(1− p)M−k+`q`(1− q)m−` .
2.3.4 Beyond the Bernoulli process
At this stage, it is not difficult to generalize our model to one where several players
may join the game at each instant of time, provided that it remains a finite Markov
chain. Introduce probabilities pm` that ` players join the game when m players are
already there. In a similar fashion, in the so called “joint scheme” above, we might
have probabilities qm` that ` players leave at the same time.
Set pmj = 0 for any j < 0. We then have
Pm,k =
m−1∑
`=0
m− `
m
qm` p
m
k−m−` . (8)
2.4 Linear quadratic problem
2.4.1 The problem
We consider an academic example as follows: the state space isX = Rd, the control
set U = Ra. the dynamics are defined by a sequence of square d× d matrices A(t)
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and a sequence of d× a matrices B(t) (both could be m-dependent) and
x(t+ 1) = A(t)x(t) +B(t)
m(t)∑
n=1
un .
There is a discount factor r (presumably no larger than one, super indices to it
are to be understood as powers), and the cost of player n is given in terms of two
sequences of (families of) square matrices Qm(t) and Rm(t), the first nonnegative
definite, the second positive definite, as
Jn = E
T∑
t=tn
rt−tn
[
‖x(t)‖2
Qm(t)(t)
+ ‖un(t)‖2Rm(t)(t)
]
.
2.4.2 Solution via the Riccati equation
As usual, we seek a solution with a quadratic Value function. We look for a uniform
equilibrium, and a one-parameter family of Value functions of the form
V mn (t, x) = r
t−tnV m(t, x) , V m(t, x) = ‖x‖2Pm(t) . (9)
Notice first that, for all m ≤ T , Pm(T ) = Qm(T ) (and clearly, the equilibrium
control, if we want to define it at time T , is u = 0.) Assume, as a recursion
hypothesis, that V m(t + 1, x) is, for all m, a quadratic form in x, i.e. that there
exist symmetric matrices Pm(t+ 1) such that
V m(t+ 1, x) = ‖x‖2Pm(t+1) .
Since the costs are always nonnegative, so are the Pm(t + 1). (Indeed they are
even positive definite as one can easily figure out.) Isaacs equation is now
V m(t, x) = min
u
{
‖x‖2Qm(t) + ‖u‖2Rm(t)
+ r
[
(1−pm)‖A(t)x+ (m−1)B(t)uˆ+B(t)u‖2Pm(t+1)
+ pm‖A(t)x+ (m−1)B(t)uˆ+B(t)u‖2Pm+1(t+1)
]}
,
the minimum in u being reached at u = uˆ. Let
Sm(t+ 1) = r
[
(1− pm)Pm(t+ 1) + pmPm+1(t+ 1)] . (10)
These are symmetric non-negative definite matrices. Isaacs’ equation can be writ-
ten
V m(t, x) = min
u
{
‖x‖2Qm(t)+‖u‖2Rm(t)+‖A(t)x+(m−1)B(t)uˆ+B(t)u‖2Sm(t+1)
}
.
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The right hand side is a (non homogeneous) quadratic form in u, with a quadratic
term coefficient R(t) + B′(t)Sm(t + 1)B(t), which is positive definite. Hence
there exists a unique minimum in u. Equating the derivative with respect to u to
zero, and equating all controls, yields
[Rm(t) +B′(t)Sm(t+ 1)B(t)]uˆ+B′(t)Sm(t+ 1)[A(t)x+ (m− 1)B(t)uˆ] = 0 .
Hence
uˆ = −Fm(t)x =: ϕˆm1 (t, x) (11)
with
Fm(t) =
[
Rm(t) +mB′(t)Sm(t+ 1)B(t)
]−1
B′(t)Sm(t+ 1)A(t) . (12)
Finally, placing this value of u in the right hand side, we find that V m(t, x) is
indeed a quadratic form in x. Thus we have proven that (9) holds, with
Pm(t) = Qm(t) + Fm′(t)Rm(t)Fm(t)
+ [A′(t)−mFm′(t)B′(t)]Sm(t+ 1)[A(t)−mB(t)Fm(t)] .
and after substituting Fm(t) and reordering:
Pm(t) =Qm(t) +A′(t)Sm(t+ 1)A(t) −
A′(t)Sm(t+ 1)B(t)[Rm(t) +mB′(t)Sm(t+ 1)B(t)]−1
[(2m− 1)Rm +m2B′(t)Sm(t+ 1)B(t)]
[Rm(t) +mB′(t)Sm(t+ 1)B(t)]−1B′(t)Sm(t+ 1)A(t) ,
(13)
∀m ∈ T , Pm(T ) = Qm(T ) . (14)
Equation (13) may be rearranged in a slightly more appealing form, where the first
three terms of the right hand side are reminiscent of a classic discrete time Riccati
equation, and the fourth and last one cancels for m = 1 (and omitting the explicit
dependences on t of the system matrices)
Pm(t) = Qm +A′Sm(t+ 1)A
−A′Sm(t+ 1)B[ 1mRm +B′Sm(t+ 1)B]−1B′Sm(t+ 1)A
−m−1m A′Sm(t+ 1)B[ 1mRm +B′Sm(t+ 1)B]−1
1
mR
m[ 1mR
m +B′Sm(t+ 1)B]−1B′Sm(t+ 1)A .
Recall that each matrix Sm involves Pm+1. But there cannot be more than T play-
ers at any time in the game (and T of them only at final time !) Therefore, starting
with P T (T ) = QT and computing the Pm(t) backward, this is a constructive
algorithm. We therefore end up with the following:
Theorem 2.3 The finite horizon, linear quadratic problem admits a unique uni-
form subgame perfect equilibrium given by equations (9,10,11,12,13,14).
15
Entering and leaving It is now easy to get the solution of the same problem with
one of our more general entry and leaving mechanisms: according to equation (8),
it suffices to replace the definition (10) of Sm by
Sm(t+ 1) = r
m+1∑
k=1
Pm,kP k(t+ 1)
with the relevant set of probabilities Pm,k.
2.4.3 Infinite horizon
We may want to consider the case where the matrices A, B, Q, and R are constant,
and the horizon infinite. For all practical purposes, we need hypothesis 2.1 limiting
the maximum number of players in the game to M . Even so, this problem does
not completely fit the framework of Theorem 2.2, because the integrand is not
bounded over Rn. Hence the added stability condition that we will need. We
can nevertheless look for a Nash equilibrium along the lines of Theorem 2.2. For
that purpose, we add a constraint for all players, that their controls be of bounded
energy, and precisely:
∞∑
t=tn
rt−tn‖un(t)‖2R(t) <∞ . (15)
We also assume that QM > 0.
We state a system of so called algebraic discrete Riccati equations for matrices
Pm, and use the notations
Sm = r[(1− pm)Pm + pmPm] , Fm = [Rm +mB′SmB(t)]−1B′SmA .
We state the theorem
Theorem 2.4 A sufficient condition for the existence of a uniform subgame perfect
pure Nash equilibrium to the infinite horizon linear quadratic game with a bounded
number of players and QM > 0 is that there exist a positive definite solution to the
system of equations
Pm =Qm +A′SmA −
A′SmB[Rm +mB′SmB]−1
[(2m− 1)Rm +m2B′SmB]
[Rm +mB′SmB]−1B′SmA ,
(16)
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and that furthermore, the following inequality hold:
1
r
QM > A′PMB
[
1
r
RM +MB′PMB
]−1
B′PMA . (17)
In that case, a Nash strategy is given by
uˆ(t) = −Fm(t)x(t) . (18)
Proof The proof goes with the same calculations as for theorem 2.1 and for the
above finite horizon case. But because the payoff is not necessarily bounded, we
need that rtV m(t)(x(t)) decrease to zero as t → ∞ for the extension of theorem
2.1 to the infinite case to hold. In infinite horizon (and without exit) the number of
players present will almost surely reach its maximum possible M . Therefore, the
asymptotic behavior of the closed-loop system depends on A−MBFM .
To investigate that condition, we use Lyapunov’s stability analysis for linear
systems, but with the state y(t) = rt/2x(t). If this state decreases exponentially,
then rt‖x(t)‖2
PM
goes to zero as t→∞. We pick the Lyapunov function U(x) =
rt‖x‖2
SM
. A direct calculation shows that
r(A−MFM )′SM (A−MFM )− SM = rPM − rFM ′RMFM − rQM − SM .
We have SM = rPM . Therefore, and since we have assumed that QM > 0, this
last matrix is negative definite, proving that indeed, if all players use the control
(18), the Value function goes to zero as t→∞.
But we also need that this be true if all players but one use the control (18), the
other one using a “finite energy” (according to equation (15)) control. This will
be guaranteed if the state y(t) = rt/2x(t) is stabilized by the dynamics driven by
m− 1 controls (18). We attempt the same Lyapunov analysis, and end up with
r[A− (M − 1)BFM ]′SM [A− (M − 1)BFM ]− SM = rPM − SM − rQM+
rA′SMB[RM +MB′SMB]−1(RM +B′SMB)[RM +MB′SMB]−1B′SMA .
Therefore, we need that
QM >A′SMB[RM+MB′SMB]−1(RM+B′SMB)[RM+MB′SMB]−1B′SMA
A sufficient condition is that
QM >A′SMB[RM+MB′SMB]−1(RM+MB′SMB)[RM+MB′SMB]−1B′SMA
which coincides with the condition (17) of the theorem.
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Conjecture 2.1 We conjecture that condition (17) is always satisfied for a small
enough r.
It remains to solve for the fixed point equation (16) on {Pm}m. A natural
approach is to integrate the dynamical Riccati equation backward in hope of reach-
ing a steady state, which is necessarily a solution of the fixed point problem. We
have no proof of that convergence at this time, but no counter-example in the many
numerical experiments we ran, in dimension up to ten for the state, and three for
the control. In every cases, we observed a rapid convergence, in less than twenty
steps for all practical purposes. As a typical example, in state dimension 10, with
pm = .5, A in companion form, and characteristic polynomial (chosen arbitrarily)
χA(z) = z
10 − 2z9 − z8 + 1.5z7 − 2z6 − 3.5z4 + 3.5z3 − z2 + 2z − 1 ,
and, no less arbitrarily,
B′ =
 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 00 1 0 0 1 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
r = 1, Q = 3I , and R = diag(2, 2, 1), the variation ∆m(t) = Pm(t+ 1)−Pm(t)
after nineteen steps has a norm [tr(∆2)]1/2 less than 10−9 for allm ∈ {1, . . . , 20}.
And while we give one typical example here, the conclusion applies to all the
experiments we made.
3 Continuous time
3.1 The problem
3.1.1 Players, dynamics and cost
We consider a game with randomly arriving (or arriving and leaving) players as
in the previous section, but in continuous-time. The players arrive as a Poisson
process of variable intensity: The interval lengths tm+1 − tm between successive
arrivals are independent random variables obeying exponential laws with intensity
λm:
P(tm+1 − tm > τ) = e−λmτ
for a given sequence of positive λm. An added difficulty, as compared to the dis-
crete time case, is that the number of possible arrivals is unbounded, even for the
finite horizon problem. For that reason, the sequence λm is a priori infinite. But we
assume that the λm are bounded by a fixed Λ. As a matter of fact, for any practical
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use of the theory, we will have to assume that the λm are all zero for m larger than
a given integer M , thus limiting the number of players to M . Alternatively, for a
finite horizon T , we may notice that for any M , the probability P(m(t) > M) is
less than (ΛT )M/M ! and therefore goes to zero as M →∞, and take argument to
neglect very large m’s.
The dynamic system is also in continuous time. The state space X is now the
Euclidean space Rd, or a subset of it, and the dynamics
x˙ = fm(t)(t, x, um(t)) , x(0) = x0 .
Standard regularity and growth hypotheses hold on the functions fm to insure ex-
istence of a unique solution in X over [0, T ] to the dynamics for every m-tuple of
measurable functions um(·) : [0, T ]→ Um.
A positive discount factor ρ is given, and the performance indices are given via
Ln(tn, x(tn), {um(·)}m∈N) =
∫ T
tn
e−ρ(t−tn)Lm(t)n (t, x(t), u
m(t)(t)) dt
as
Jn(tn, x(tn), {um(·)}m∈N) = ELn(tn, x(tn), {um(·)}m∈N) . (19)
The functions Lmn are assumed to be continuous and uniformly bounded.
As in the discrete time case, we consider identical players, i.e. the functions fm
are invariant by a permutation of the un, and the functions Lmn enjoy the properties
of a game with identical players as detailed in the appendix A.
3.1.2 Strategies and equilibrium
We seek a state feedback equilibrium. Let Am be the set of admissible feedbacks
when m players are present. A control law ϕ : [0, T ] × X → U will be in Am if,
on the one hand, the differential equation
x˙ = fm(t, x, ϕ(t, x)×m)
has a unique solution for any initial data (tn, xn) ∈ [0, T ] × X, and on the other
hand, for every measurable u(·) : [0, T ]→ U, the differential equation
x˙ = fm(t, x(t), {u(t), ϕ(t, x(t))×m\1})
has a unique solution over [0, T ] for any initial data (tn, xn) ∈ [0, T ]× X.
We define a state feedback pure equilibrium as in the previous section, namely
via definition 2.3. Moreover, we shall be concerned only with uniform such equi-
librium strategies.
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3.1.3 Mixed strategies and disturbances
We have rather avoid the complexity of mixed strategies in continuous time (see,
however, [9]), as experience teaches us that they are often unnecessary.
Adding disturbances to the dynamics and payoff as in the discrete time problem
is not difficult. But the notation need to be changed to that of diffusions, and we
would get extra second order terms in Isaacs equation, due to Ito calculus. All
results carry over with the necessary adaptations. We keep with the deterministic
set up for the sake of simplicity.
3.2 Isaacs equation
3.2.1 Finite horizon
The Isaacs equation naturally associated with a uniform equilibrium in this problem
is as follows, where uˆ stands for the argument of the minimum (we write Vt and
Vx for the partial derivatives of V ):
∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× X , (ρ+ λm)V m(t, x)− λmV m+1(t, x)− V mt (t, x)−
min
u∈U
[
V mx (t, x)f
m(t, x, {u, uˆ×m\1}) + Lm1 (t, x, {u, uˆ×m\1})
]
= 0 , (20)
∀x ∈ X , V m(T, x) = 0 .
As already mentioned, even for a finite horizon, the number of players that may
join the game is unbounded. Therefore, equation (20) is an infinite system of par-
tial differential equations for an infinite family of functions V m(t, x). We will
therefore make use of the hypothesis similar to 2.1:
Hypothesis 3.1 There exists an integer M such that λM = 0.
As hypothesis 2.1 of the discrete time case, this is a natural hypothesis in case of a
decreasing payoff and fixed finite entry cost, and akin to classical approximations
of the Isaacs equation in dynamic programming algorithms.
Under that hypothesis, using the tools of piecewise deterministic Markov deci-
sion Processes, we have the following easy extension of [12]:
Theorem 3.1 A uniform subgame perfect equilibrium exists if and only if there ex-
ists a family of admissible feedbacks ϕm ∈ Am and a family of bounded uniformly
continuous functions V m(t, x) that are, for all m ≤ M , viscosity solutions of the
partial differential equation (20). Then, un(t) = ϕˆm(t)(t, x(t)) is a uniform sub-
game perfect equilibrium, and the equilibrium cost of player n joining the game at
time tn and state xn is V n(tn, xn).
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A sketch of the proof is given in appendix B.1.
The question naturally arises of what can be said of the problem without the
hypothesis 3.1. To investigate this problem, we consider an “original problem”
defined by its infinite sequence {λm}m∈N, assumed bounded :
∃Λ > 0 : ∀m ∈ N , λm ≤ Λ .
and a family of “modified problems” depending on an integerM , where we modify
the sequence {λm} at λM that we set equal to zero. (And therefore all λm for
m > M are irrelevant: there will never be more than M players.) The theorem
above holds for all modified problems, whatever the M chosen. We call V m|M
(a finite family) the solution of the corresponding equation (20). They yield the
equilibrium value of the cost JM in the modified problems.
We propose in appendix B.2 arguments in favor of the following
Conjecture 3.1 As M goes to infinity, the equilibrium state feedbacks ϕM of the
modified problems converge, in L1 (possibly weighted by a weight exp(−α‖x‖))
toward an equilibrium feedback ϕ? of the original problem, and the functions
V m|M converge in C1 toward the equilibrium value V m. Consequently, theorem
3.1 holds for the original, unmodified problem.
3.2.2 Infinite horizon
We assume here that the functions fm and Lmn are time invariant, and ρ > 0. We
set
Jn(tn, x(tn), {um(·)}m∈N) = E
∫ ∞
tn
e−ρ(t−tn)Lm(t)n (t, x(t), u
m(t)) dt .
As expected, we get
Theorem 3.2 Under hypothesis 3.1, a uniform subgame perfect equilibrium in in-
finite horizon exists if and only if there exists a family of admissible feedbacks
ϕˆm ∈ Am and a family of bounded uniformly continuous functions V m(x) that
are, for all m, viscosity solutions of the following partial differential equation,
where uˆ stands for ϕˆm(t, x) and the minimum is reached precisely at u = uˆ:
∀x ∈ X , 0 = (ρ+ λm)V m(x)− λmV m+1(x)− (21)
min
u∈U
[
V mx (x)f
m(x, {u, uˆ×m\1}) + Lm1 (x, {u, uˆ×m\1})
]
(22)
Then, un(t) = ϕˆm(t)(x(t)) is a uniform subgame perfect equilibrium, and the
equilibrium cost of player n joining the game at state xn is V n(xn).
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The proof involves extending equation (20) to the infinite horizon case, a sketch
of which is provided in appendix B.1, relying on the boundedness of the functions
V m to ensure that exp(−ρT )V m(x(T )) goes to zero as T increases to infinity. The
rest is exactly as in the previous subsubsection.
The original problem without the bounding hypothesis 3.1 requires a different
approach from that of the previous subsection, because in infinite horizon, it is no
longer true that P(ΩM ) is small. Indeed it is equal to one if the hypothesis does
not hold and the λm have a lower bound.
3.3 Entering and leaving
As in the discrete time case, we may extend the theory to the case where the players
mays also leave the game. We consider that once a player has left, it does not
re-enter. We let Tn be the exit time of player n. In the joint exit mechanism,
the process that one of the m players present may leave is a Poisson process with
intensity µm, and if one does, it is one of the players present with equal probability.
In the individual scheme, each of the m players present has a Poisson exit process
with probability µm.
We leave it to the reader to check that Isaacs’ equation now reads
(ρ+ Pm,m)V m(t, x)− Pm,m+1V m+1(t, x)− Pm,m−1V m−1(t, x)− V mt (t, x)
−min
u∈U
[
V mx (t, x)f
m(t, x, {u, uˆm\1}) + Lm1 (t, x, {u, uˆm\1})
]
= 0 ,
where the coefficients Pm,` are given by the following table:
scheme Pm,m−1 Pm,m Pm,m+1
joint m−1m µ
m λm + µm λm
individual µm λm +mµm λm
(23)
3.4 Linear quadratic problem
3.4.1 Finite horizon
We turn tho the standard linear quadratic case, where the dynamics are given by
piecewise continuous (or even measurable) time dependent matricesA(t) andB(t)
of dimensions, respectively d× d and d× a (both could be m-dependent)
x˙ = A(t)x+B(t)
m∑
n=1
un .
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The cost to be minimized is given by a discount factor ρ, a family of piecewise
continuous, nonnegative definite symmetric d × d matrices Qm(t) and positive
definite a× a matrices R(t) as
Jn = E
[∫ T
tn
e−ρ(t−tn)
(
‖x(t)‖2
Qm(t)
+ ‖un(t)‖2R
)
dt
]
.
(It is only for notational convenience that we do not let the matrix R depend on
m, because we will need its inverse R−1.) We again seek a uniform solution with
Value functions
V m(t, x) = ‖x‖2Pm(t) . (24)
Isaacs equation now reads
ρ‖x‖2Pm(t) = min
u∈U
[
‖x‖2
P˙m(t)
+ 2x′Pm(t)(A(t)x+B(t)u+ (m− 1)B(t)uˆ)
+ ‖x‖2Qm(t) + ‖u‖2R(t)
]
+ λm
(‖x‖2
P (m+1)(t)
− ‖x‖2Pm(t)
)
.
We drop explicit explicit time dependences of the system matrices for legibility.
We obtain
uˆ = −R−1B′Pm(t)x (25)
and
P˙m−(ρ+λm)Pm+PmA+A′Pm−(2m−1)PmBR−1B′Pm+Qm+λmPm+1 = 0
(26)
with the terminal condition
Pm(T ) = 0 . (27)
To get a practically usable theory, we limit the possible number of players
according to hypothesis 3.1. Under that hypothesis, we prove the following:
Theorem 3.3 The finite horizon linear quadratic problem with a bounded max-
imum number of players has a unique uniform equilibrium given by equations
(24,25,26,27).
Proof There remains to prove that the Riccati equations have a solution over
[0, T ]. Notice first that the equation for PM stands alone. It is the same as the
Riccati equation associated to the simple optimization problem
x˙ = A(t)x+B(t)u , x(0) = x0 ,
J =
∫ T
0
e−(ρ+λ
M )t
(‖x‖2QM + (2M − 1)‖u‖2RM ) dt .
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Therefore, PM (t) is known to exist and be non-negative definite over [0, T ]. (It
is non-negative as long as it exists as giving the infimum of a non-negative cost,
and bounded by above by he value of the same cost obtained, e.g. with u = 0.)
Assume as a recursion hypothesis that Pm(t) is defined and non-negative defi-
nite over [0, T ]. Then, the Riccati equation for Pm(·) is the same as that for the
same control problem as above with m instead of M , but with QM replaced by
Q˜m = Qm + λmPm+1. Therefore we also have existence of a non-negative defi-
nite Pm(t), and therefore recursively, for all m ≤M .
Entering and leaving We may of course deal with the case where players may
leave the game in the same way as before, replacing in the Riccati equation (26)
the term
λm
(
Pm+1(t)− Pm(t))
by
Pm,m−1Pm−1(t)− Pm,mPm(t) + Pm,m+1Pm+1(t) .
the Pm,k being given by the table (23). Te same existence theorem applies, with
some care. The Riccati equations can no longer be integrated in sequence from
m = M down to m = 1. But they can still be integrated backward jointly, as a
finite dimensional ordinary differential equation. As long as all Pm(t) exist, the
interpretation as Value functions of nonnegative costs still guarantees te nonnega-
tivity of all Pm matrices. But this in turn guarantees the existence over [0, T ] with
the interpretation as Riccati equations of ordinary linear quadratic control problems
with positive weighting matrices.
3.4.2 Infinite horizon
We consider now the linear quadratic problem with A, B, Qm, and Rm constant
matrices, and
Jn = E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρ(t−tn)
(‖x(t)‖2
Qm(t)
+ ‖u(t)‖2R
)
.
We assume that hypothesis 3.1 holds, and that QM > 0. Furthermore, we
impose on all players the constraint that their controls be of “finite energy” in the
precise sense that ∫ ∞
tn
e−ρt‖un(t)‖2R dt <∞ . (28)
The Riccati equation is replaced by its algebraic counterpart
(ρ+λm)Pm = PmA+A′Pm−(2m−1)PmBR−1B′Pm+Qm+λmPm+1 . (29)
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Under the hypothesis 3.1 of a bounded number of players, we have the following
result:
Theorem 3.4 If the pair (A,B) is stabilizable and QM > 0, the Riccati equations
(26) integrated from Pm(0) = 0 have positive definite limits P¯m as t → −∞
solutions of the algebraic Riccati equations (29).
Furthermore, for a large enough ρ, it holds that
P¯MBR−1B′P¯M −QM < 0 , (30)
and then the infinite horizon linear quadratic game with a bounded number of play-
ers has a uniform subgame perfect pure Nash equilibrium obtained by replacing
Pm by P¯m in formula (25).
Proof The proof of the asymptotic behavior of equations (26) relies on the same
identification with a control Riccati equation as for the finite horizon problem.
Thus, PM (t) does have a positive definite limit as t → −∞. It remains to extend
to the variable matrix Q˜M−1(t) := QM−1 + λMPM (t) the standard theory of the
linear quadratic regulator, a simple matter, to conclude that the solution PM−1(t)
of the differential equation in PM−1 also has a limit as t → −∞. In this process,
we notice that since QM−1 has been assumed nonnegative definite and PM is pos-
itive definite, it follows that Q˜M−1(t) is positive definite, and therefore the pair
(Q˜M−1(·), A) is detectable over (−∞, 0). And then, the same reasoning applies
recursively as m decreases to 1.
Consider x′P˙mx with a constant x. Applying a standard comparison theorem
for ordinary differential equations shows that Pm(t) is decreasing as ρ increases.
Moreover, equation (29) divided through by ρ shows that the limit as ρ → ∞ is
P¯m = 0. Hence, for a large enough ρ, condition (30) is indeed satisfied.
In infinite time, the maximum number of players will almost surely reach M .
Therefore, the asymptotic behavior of the closed-loop system depends on the con-
trols for m = M . It is a simple matter to check that if all players use this strategy,
d
dt
(
e−ρt‖x‖2P¯M
)
= −e−ρtx′[P¯MBR−1B′P¯M +QM ]x .
Using Lyapunov stability theory for linear systems, it follows that the Value func-
tion exp(−ρt)‖x(t‖2
P¯M
goes to zero as t→∞, which is needed to apply theorem
3.2.
We also need that this be true if only (M − 1) players use their control (25),
and the other one any finite energy (in the sense of (28)) control. This will be true
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if the system with the M − 1 feedbacks stabilizes exp(−ρt‖x(t)‖2
P¯M
. Applying
the same technique, we find that, in these conditions,
d
dt
(
e−ρt‖x‖2P¯M
)
= e−ρtx′[P¯MBR−1B′P¯M −QM ]x .
Hence the condition (30).
4 Conclusion
The tools of piecewise deterministic Markov decision processes have been ex-
tended to games with random players arrivals and exits. We have chosen some
specific problems within this wide class, namely identical players (there might be
several classes of players as in, e.g. [27]). We have emphasized a Bernoulli ar-
rival process in the discrete time case, Poisson in the continuous time case, at first
with no exit. Yet, we have given a few examples of other schemes, both with more
general arrivals, and with exit at random times also.
We have also considered a restricted class of linear quadratic problems as illus-
tration. The continuous time problem lends itself to a rather complete theory where
we have existence and limit results similar to what is available for the elementary
one-player optimization counterpart. All these might be extended to other cases.
The present article shows clearly how to proceed. The question is to find which
other cases are both interesting and, if possible, lead to feasible computational al-
gorithms.
In that respect, the unbounded number of players in the infinite horizon dis-
crete time problem, and in all cases in continuous time, poses a problem, mainly
computational in the former case, also mathematical in the later, because of the
difficulty of dealing with an infinite set of partial differential equations. The com-
putational problem, however, is nothing very different from that of discretizing an
infinite state space.
We consider that the main weaknesses of the present theory, beyond its dif-
ficulty of dealing with an unbounded number of players, is the lack of a private
state for each player. This would allow us to deal with several classes of players
as, say, in [27], or more general models such as in [16], and also with other exit
mechanisms such as a fixed residence time T for all players.
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A Games with identical players
A.1 Model and properties
By assumption, in the game considered here, all players are identical. To reflect
this fact in the mathematical model, we need to consider permutations pim ∈ Πm
of the elements of {1, 2, . . . ,m}. We also recall the notation
um\n := (u1, . . . , un−1, un+1, . . . , um) ,
{um\n, u} := (u1, . . . , un−1, u, un+1, . . . , um)
Furthermore, we denote
upi = upi[m] :=
(
upi(1), upi(2), . . . , upi(m)
)
,
upi[m]\pi(n) :=
(
upi(1), . . . , upi(n−1), upi(n+1), . . . , upi(m)
)
,
{upi[m]\pi(n), u} := (upi(1), . . . , upi(n−1), u, upi(n+1), . . . , upi(m)) ,
u×m := (u, u, . . . , u) ∈ Um .
Definition A.1 A m-person game {Jn : Um → R}, n = 1, . . . ,m will be called
a game with identical players if, for any permutation pi of the set {1, . . . ,m}, it
holds that
∀n ≤ m, Jn(upi(1), . . . , upi(m)) = Jpi(n)(u1, . . . , um) . (31)
We shall write this equation as Jn(upi[m]) = Jpi(n)(um).
An alternate definition of a game with identical players is given by the following:
Lemma A.1 A game with identical player is defined by a functionG : U×Um−1 →
R invariant by a permutation of the elements of its second argument, i.e. such that,
∀u ∈ U , ∀vm−1 ∈ Um−1 ,∀pi ∈ Πm−1 , G(u, vm−1) = G(u, vpi[m−1]) . (32)
And the Jn are defined by
Jn(u
m) = G(un, u
m\n) (33)
Proof It is clear that if the Jn are defined by (33) with G satisfying (32), they
satisfy (31). Indeed, then
Jn(u
pi[m]) = G(upi(n), u
pi[m]\pi(n)) = G(upi(n), um\pi(n)) = Jpi(n)(um) .
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Conversely, assume that the Jn satisfy (31). Define
G(u1, u
m\1) = J1(um) .
Let pi1 ∈ Πm−1, and pi defined by pi(1) = 1, and for all j ≥ 2, pi(j) = pi1(j − 1).
(i.e. pi is any permutation of Πm that leaves 1 invariant.) It follows from (31) that
G(u1, u
m\1) = J1(um) = Jpi(1)(um) = J1({u1, upi1[m\1] = G(u1, upi1[m\1]) .
Therefore G is invariant by a permutation of the elements of its second argument.
Let now pi be a permutation such that pi(1) = n. We have
Jn(u
m) = Jpi(1)(u
m) = J1(u
pi) = G(upi(1), u
pi\pi(1)) = G(un, um\n) ,
which is equation (33). And this proves the lemma.
The main fact is that the set of pure Nash equilibria is invariant by a permuta-
tion of the decisions:
Theorem A.1 Let {Jn : Um → R}, n = 1, . . . ,m be a game with identical
players. Then if uˆm is a Nash equilibrium, so is uˆpi[m].
Proof Consider Jn(uˆpi[m]), and then substitute some u to uˆpi(n) in the argument.
Because Jn(upi[m]) = Jpi(n)(um), it follows that
Jn({uˆpi[m]\pi(n), u}) = Jpi(n)({uˆm\pi(n), u}) ≥ Jpi(n)(uˆm) = Jn(uˆpi[m]) .
And this is true for all n ≤ m, which proves the theorem.
Example An example of the above reasoning is as follows. Let m = 2 and by
hypothesis, ∀(u1, u2), J1(u2, u1) = J2(u1, u2). Let (uˆ1, uˆ2) be a Nash equilib-
rium. Let us show that (uˆ2, uˆ1) is also an equilibrium:
∀u , J1(u, uˆ1) = J2(uˆ1, u) ≥ J2(uˆ1, uˆ2) = J1(uˆ2, uˆ1).
Corollary A.1 A pure Nash equilibrium of a game with identical players can be
unique only if it is uniform, i.e. with all players using the same control:
∃uˆ ∈ U : ∀n ≤ m, uˆmn = uˆ .
Existence of such a Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed, and even if it exists, it
might not be the only one. However there is a simple way to look for one. Let us
first assert the following fact:
Theorem A.2 Let {Jn : Um → R}, n = 1, . . . ,m be a game with identical
players. If the function u1 7→ J1({um\1, u1}) is convex, so are all the functions
un 7→ Jn({um\n, un}).
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Proof Let u˜m = (un, u2, . . . , un−1, u1, un+1, . . . , um), and let pi1,n be the per-
mutation that exchanges 1 and n. Then, um = u˜pi
1,n
. Thus,
Jn(u
m) = Jn(u˜
pi1,n) = J1(u˜
m) = J1(un, . . .) .
Now, J1 is by hypothesis convex in its first argument, here un. Therefore Jn is
convex in un.
Finally, we shall use the corollary of the following theorem1:
Theorem A.3 Let {Jn : Um → R}, n = 1, . . . ,m be a game with identical play-
ers. Let u ∈ U and u×m = (u, u, . . . , u) ∈ Um. Then
∀n ≤ m, DnJn(u×m) = D1J1(u×m) .
Proof Observe first that obviously,
∀n ≤ m, Jn(u×m) = J1(u×m).
Let now u˜m = (u + δu, u, . . . , u), and as previously pi1,n be the permutation that
exchanges 1 and n. Let perturb the n-th control in Jn(u×m) by δu. We get
Jn(u, . . . , u, u+ δu, u, . . . , u) = Jn(u˜
pi1,n) = J1(u˜
m).
Therefore, the differential quotients involved in DnJn(u×m) and D1J1(u×m) are
equal, hence the result.
Corollary A.2 If u1 7→ J1(um) is convex, an interior solution uˆ ∈ U of the equa-
tion
D1J1(u
×m) = 0 (34)
yields a uniform Nash equilibrium uˆ×m.
A.2 Examples of games with identical players
The best known example of game with identical players is Cournot’s duopoly. This,
incidentally, is an aggregative game according to the definition of [17], which are
a sub-class of games with identical players. We propose three 2-player games with
identical players with different structures of equilibria. Let i ∈ {1, 2}:
Πi(u1, u2) = (u1 − u2)2 − au2i . (35)
1Where we use Dieudone´’s notation DkJ for the partial derivative of J with respect to its k-th
variable
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A.2.1 Example 1
In this example, U = R and 1 < a < 2. Then u1 7→ Π1(u1, u2) is concave for all
u2. Moreover
D1Π1(u1, u2) = 2(1− a)u1 − 2u2
so that the unique maximum in u1 is reached at u1 = −u2/(1 − a). Therefore a
Nash equilibrium requires that
(a− 1)u1 + u2 = 0 ,
u1 + (a− 1)u2 = 0 .
The determinant of the matrix of this system is a(a − 2) < 0. Therefore, the
matrix is invertible, the only solution is u1 = u2 = 0. There is a single (pure)
Nash equilibrium, which is uniform.
The question of whether there can exist a mixed Nash equilibrium is investi-
gated as follows: let u2 be a random variable (a mixed strategy). Clearly, then
EΠ1(u1, u2) = (1− a)u21 − 2E(u2)u1 + E(u22) .
This has a unique maximum at u1 = −E(u2)/(a−1). Therefore Player 1’s strategy
is necessarily pure, but then Player 2’s strategy also.
A.2.2 Example 2
We use the same example as above, but with a = 2. Then any pair (u1, u2) =
(u,−u) solves the Nash necessary condition, and in view of the concavity of the
payoffs, is a (pure) Nash equilibrium. Indeed Π1(−v, v)−Π1(u, v) = (u+ v)2 ≥
0, and symmetrically Π2(u,−u)−Π2(u, v) = (u+v)2 ≥ 0. The set of Nash equi-
libria is, as predicted, invariant by a permutation u1 ↔ u2. (However, Πi(u,−u) =
−2u2, so that both players prefer the equilibrium (0, 0).)
No mixed equilibrium is possible for the same reason as above.
A.2.3 example 3
We use now U = [0, 1] and a < 1. Now u1 7→ Π1(u1, u2) is convex for all u2.
Therefore a maximum in u1 can only be reached at u1 = 0 or u1 = 1. Observe
that
Π1(1, u2)−Π1(0, u2) = 1− a− 2u2 .
Therefore, for u2 < (1 − a)/2, the maximum of Π1 is reached at u1 = 1, while
for u2 > (1 − a)/2, it is reached at u1 = 0. We therefore find two pure Nash
equilibria: (1, 0) and (0, 1).
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Indeed, once it is established that pure Nash equilibria can only be found at
ui ∈ {0, 1}, we can investigate the matrix game
u1\u2 0 1
0 1− a
0 0 1
1 −a
1 1− a −a
The two pure Nash equilibria appear naturally. We can also look for a mixed equi-
librium, obtained for P(ui = 0) = (1 + a)/2, P(ui = 1) = (1 − a)/2. In that
case E(u2) = (1− a)/2. This an mixed equilibrium of the matrix game, and also
an equilibrium of the game over the unit square, since the maxima can only be
attained at 0 or 1. (The fact that also Π1(0, (1 − a)/2) = Π1(1, (1 − a)/2) is a
coincidence, due to the fact that Π1(1, u2)−Π1(0, u2) is affine in u2.)
B Continuous Isaacs equation
B.1 Modified, boundedm, problem
We first evaluate the following mathematical expectation, given tm:
Sm = E
[∫ tm+1
tm
e−ρtLm(t, x(t), um(t)) dt+ e−ρtm+1V m+1(tm+1, x(tm+1)
]
.
given that both Lm(t) and V m+1(t) are taken equal to zero if t > T . We have
Sm = e−λm(T−tm)
∫ T
tm
e−ρtLm(t, x(t), um(t)) dt+∫ T
tm
λme−λ
m(τ−tm)
[∫ τ
tm
e−ρtLm(t, x(t), um(t)) dt+ e−ρτV m+1(τ, x(τ))
]
dτ .
Exchanging the order of summations in the double integral, changing the name of
the integration variable in the second, it comes, after cancellation of the first term
with one of those coming from the double integral:
Sm =
∫ T
tm
e−λm(t−tm)−ρt
(
Lm(t, x(t), um(t)) + λmV m+1(t, x(t))
)
dt . (36)
We turn to the Isaacs equation (20), and deal with it as if the Value functions V m
were of class C1. Multiply both sides of the equation by exp(−λ(t − tm) − ρt)
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and rewrite it as
d
dt
(
e−λ
m(t−tm)−ρtV m(t, x(t)
)
+ e−λ
m(t−tm)−ρtLm(t, x(t), um(t))
+ λme−λ
m(t−tm)−ρtV m+1(t, x(t)) ≥ 0 ,
being understood that the lagrangian derivative and Lm are evaluated at um(t) =
{u(t), uˆ(m\1)(t)}, and that the inequality becomes an equality for u(t) = uˆ(t).
Integrating from tm to T , we recognize Sm and write
e−ρtmV m(tm, x(tm)) ≤ e−(λm+ρ)T+λmtmV m(T, x(T ))
+ E
[∫ tm+1
tm
Lm(t, x(t), um(t)) + e−ρtm+1V m+1(tm+1, x(tm+1))
]
.
In the finite horizon version, we have V m(T, x) = 0, so that the first term in the
right hand side cancels, and we are left with
e−ρtmV m(tm, x(tm)) ≤
+ E
[∫ tm+1
tm
Lm(t, x(t), um(t)) + e−ρtm+1V m+1(tm+1, x(tm+1))
]
if player one, say, deviates alone from uˆm(t), and equality if um(t) = uˆ(m)(t). In
the infinite horizon case, use the fact that V m is bounded to see that the same first
term of the r.h.s. cancels in the limit as T goes to infinity.
With this last inequality, we proceed as in discrete dynamic programing: take
the a priori expectation of both sides, sum for all m ≤ M , cancel the terms that
appear on both sides of the sum and use t1 = 0 (the first player starts at time 0) to
get
V 1(0, x0) ≤ E
∫ T
0
e−ρtLm(t)(t, x(t), um(t)) dt = J1(0, x0, um) ,
for um(t) = {u(t), u(m\1)(t)}, and equality if um(t) = uˆ(m)(t).
Having restricted our search to state feedback strategies and to a uniform equi-
librium of identical players, and ignoring the intrinsic fixed point problem that for
each (m, t, x) the minimizing control be precisely φˆm(t, x) used by all other play-
ers, the inequality in definition 2.3 defines a unique minimization problem. As a
consequence, in the case where the functions V m are not globallyC1, both the nec-
essary and the sufficiency characters with viscosity solutions are derived from this
calculation in the same way as for one-player control problems. But a major dif-
ference with that case is that here, existence is far from granted. On the one hand,
the fixed point for each (m, t, x) may not exist, and on the other hand, if it always
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does, it might not define an admissible strategy as characterized in paragraph 3.1.2.
The situation is more complex for many player games than for two player games,
where one can dispense with state feedback strategies. For these difficult technical
matters, see [10, 13, 23, 18].
B.2 Unmodified unboundedm problem
We aim to extend theorem 3.1 to the unmodified problem where the number of
players who may join the game before the time T is unbounded, and therefore
equation (20) involves an infinite number of functions V m. We simplify the nota-
tions as follows. Given two admissible state feedbacks φ and ψ, let
G(φ, ψ) = J1({φ, ψ×m(t)\1})
and the same with upper index M (respectively N ) be the corresponding quantity
in the modified problem where λM = 0 (resp. λN = 0).
We make the following hypotheses which would need to be converted into
hypotheses bearing on the data fm and Lm of the problem, probably via the hamil-
tonian
Hm(t, x, p, u, v) = 〈p, f(t, x, {u, v×m\1})〉+ L(t, x, {u, v×m\1}) .
We endow the set of state feedbacks with the topology of L1 and assume:
Hypothesis B.1
1. The function φ 7→ G(φ, ψ) is, for all ψ quasi convex with a unique minimum
and differentiable.
2. there exists a positive number β such that,
∀M ∈ N , ∀φ, χ, ψ ∈ A , ∀µ ∈ [0, 1]
GM
(
(1− µ)φ+ µχ, ψ)) ≥
(1− µ)GM (φ, ψ) + µGM (χ, ψ)− β
2
µ(1− µ)‖u− v‖2 .
If φ 7→ GM (φ, ψ) is of class C2, this is equivalent to
∀φ, χ, ψ ∈ A , |〈D11G(φ, ψ)χ, χ〉| ≤ β‖χ‖2 .
3. For all M and ψ, the map φ 7→ D1GM (φ, φ) is locally invertible in a
neighborhood of zero with an inverse locally uniformly Lipshitz of modu-
lus γ. If (φ, ψ) 7→ GM (φ, ψ) is of class C2, it suffices that the operator
D11G(φ, ψ) + D12G(φ, ψ) be onto, with an inverse uniformly bounded by a
positive number γ.
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With this set of hypotheses, too abstract at this stage, we can prove the conjecture
3.1. We first prove a simple lemma.
Let P be the probability structure induced by the entry process in the original
problem, E the mathematical expectation in that probability law, PM the probabil-
ity law induced by the modified problem with λM = 0, and EM the mathematical
expectation in that law. We prove the following lemma.
Lemma B.1 Let X(ω) be a bounded random variable measurable on the sigma-
field generated by the entry process. EMX converges to EX as M goes to infinity.
Proof In the original problem, let ΩM be the set of events for which m(T ) < M
and ΩM the complement: events such that m(T ) ≥ M . These sets belong to the
sigma-field generated by the entry process. We have
E(X) =
∫
ΩM
X(ω) dP(ω) +
∫
ΩM
X(ω) dP(ω)
and similarly for EMX . Now, both laws coincide over ΩM . Therefore
|EX − EMX| =
∣∣∣∣∫
ΩM
X(ω) d
(
P(ω)− PM (ω))∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
ω∈ΩM
|X(ω)| (P(ΩM ) + PM (ΩM )) .
Notice finally that P(ΩM ) = PM (ΩM ), and therefore for their complements:
P(ΩM ) = PM (ΩM ) = P(m(T ) ≥M) < (ΛT )
M
M !
which goes to zero with M . As a consequence, EMX converges to EX as M goes
to infinity.
Let M < N be two integers. Let ϕM and ϕN be the equilibrium feedbacks
of the modified problems GM and GN respectively. Using the lemma, we see that
given a positive number ε, there exists an integer K such that for any M and N
lager than K, and any ϕ,
|GM (ϕ,ϕN )−GN (ϕ,ϕN )| ≤ ε .
It follows that
∀ϕ ,GM (ϕ,ϕN ) ≥ GN (ϕ,ϕN )− ε ≥ GN (ϕN , ϕN )− ε ≥ GM (ϕN , ϕN )− 2ε .
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From the fact that GM (ϕN , ϕN ) is close to the minimum in φ of GM (φ, ϕN ) and
hypothesis 2, we may derive that
‖D1GM (ϕN , ϕN )‖ ≤ 2
√
βε.
On the other hand, D1GM (ϕM , ϕM ) = 0. From hypothesis 3 we conclude that
‖ϕN − ϕM‖ ≤ 2γ
√
βε .
Hence the sequence {ϕM} is Cauchy, and thus converges to some ϕ?. Hence the
V m|M converge, and because all satisfy the P.D.E. they converge in C1.
The hypotheses B.1 can be made mode concrete with the following approach,
only sketched here. We consider again the system of partial differential
ρWm(t, x) = Wmt (t, x) +H
m(t, x,Wmx (t, x), u, v)
+ λm[Wm+1(t, x)−Wm(t, x)] ,
Wm(T, x) = 0 .
When we set furthermore, for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd, WM+1(t, x) = 0 in the
system above, this uncouples the equation forWM from the other ones, and allows
one to consider the system in decreasing order ofm as a finite sequence of P.D.E’s.
We denote with Wm|M such a family of solutions with m ≤M .
Choose a pair of admissible state feedbacks φ and ψ. Consider the above sys-
tem with, for all (t, x), u = φm(t)(t, x) and v = ψm(t)(t, x). It follows from
the analysis of the previous subsection that a viscosity solution exists and that, if
x(tn) = xn
Wm|M (tn, xn) = GMn (φ, ψ) .
And the V m|M (t, x) are the equilibrium values for a uniform equilibrium, obtained
for φ(t, x) = ψ(t, x) = ϕM (t, x). We will use the shorthand notation uM (respec-
tively uN ) in the equations. As a consequence, for instance
V m|M (tm, x(tm)) = GMm (ϕ
M , ϕM ) = min
φ
GMm (φ, ϕ
M ) .
It follows that each ϕm|M minimizes the criterion Sm (36), and that, for M and N
large enough, |Wm|M −Wm|N | is smaller than an arbitrarily chosen ε. Let
Hm(t, x, p, u, v) = Lm(t, x, {u, v×m\1}) + 〈p, fm(t, x, {u, v×m\1})〉 .
The second derivative version of hypothesis B.1.2 derives from the standard second
variation theory and the hypothesis that the solution y(t) of the linear differential
equations
y˙ = D2f
m(t, x, (ϕM (t, x))×m)y + Du1f
m(t, x, (ϕM (t, x))×m)w(t)
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and the second derivative (
D22H
m D24H
m
D42H
m D44H
m
)
are uniformly bounded. Then we conclude that the L∞ norm
‖D4Hm(t, x,Wm|Mx (t, x), uN , uN )‖∞
is less than 2
√
βε, and that thus the equation
D4H
m(t,Wm|Mx (t, x), u, u) = 0
has a solution uM close to uN , leading to the conclusion that the sequence {ϕM}
is Cauchy and thus convergent.
38
